Intent to Implement System Add-on: SHIELD/Normandy

[Michael Kelly]

Ah, gotcha. It sounds like the reproducibility of the actions that I mentioned earlier would cover the non-system-addon parts of this, because it'd let you inspect the source code for things like that and confirm that they built JS you receive is built from that source.

Changes being shipped via the system add-on itself aren't really anything Normandy can do about, though. That's up to the system add-on framework.

Thanks for the clarification!
- Mike Kelly

On 10/3/16 10:31 AM, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Michael Kelly:
>
> > What do you mean by subpeona-proof? I don't quite understand how that
> > relates to your second paragraph.
>
> The description mentioned that this is for targeted delivery of
> browser tweaks.
>
> I wonder if you perceive it as a risk that Mozilla might receive a
> subpoena that orders the organization to deliver specific browser
> tweaks to subsets of users.  It's not clear what is possible here.
> Potential examples are deconfiguring proxy servers, changing TLS
> preferences, loading additional IFRAMEs, or triggering browser
> behavior which is visible even through encryption and tuneling.
>
> I hope this explains the nature of such concerns.
>